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“Recommendation 1 to [Department of Energy]:  Improve understanding of 
customer and society value associated with increased resilience….” 
Consensus Study Report on “Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System,” 
National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine,  
September 2017. 
      
Executive Summary 
 
Resilient energy systems are becoming a higher priority in the United States.  Resiliency has 
become higher profile recently following a series of major storms in the U.S. Gulf Coast plus 
cyber-security failures.  The U.S. Department of Energy and the National Academy of Science 
both published reports in September of 2017 on the state of U.S. Grid reliability. 
 
Yet, as noted by the Academy of Science, we still do not really have a sense of the value of 
resiliency to customers.  Most studies have focused primarily on understanding the cost of lost 
production.  Economists have developed strategies for estimating the value of lost load (VOLL) 
for certain industries based upon the ratio of the gross domestic product for that industry to the 
total electricity consumed.  The VOLL estimate, in this sense, is equivalent to the value of lost 
opportunity associated with a power outage.   
 
The Study Team used this strategy to estimate the cost of lost load for a broad range of industries, 
using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to group the sectors.  Based 
upon these estimates, the Study Team determined that certain industries, such as computer 
systems design, scientific consulting services and legal services incur $80-$100/kWh in lost 
productivity.  Thus a law firm with a 100 kW load would lose $8,000 in an hour.  Even some forms 
of manufacturing, generally considered the most capable of industries to handle interruptible 
power, suffer around $40/kWh.  For instance, a household goods manufacturer with a 10 MW 
load loses $400,000 in an hour.   
 
However, VOLL is just one way to estimate the value of resiliency to a customer.  Another way to 
estimate value is to identify the costs of building back-up power systems.  This can be done by 
looking at the costs data centers incur by improving their electricity uptime to increasingly higher 
levels.  The Study Team used the Expedient data center “build versus outsource” algorithm, 
holding all parameters but reliability level constant, and estimated the costs of upgrading the 
system to each new level.  From this, capital investment and labor costs of resiliency can be 
estimated.   
 
Most data centers seek 99.999% (5-nine) uptime. This is representative of the standard of 
resiliency needed by many businesses and organizations that have critical infrastructure 
requirements, such as communication industries, military bases, and emergency management.   
The cost of achieving 5-nine reliability can be estimated for Northeast Ohio by first looking at the 
state of resiliency for the local utility, Cleveland Electric and Illuminating Company (CEI).  Based 
upon the outage records reported to the Public Utility Commission of Ohio (PUCO), the Study 
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Team determined that CEI has averaged around 99.93% uptime over the past 8 years.  This 
excludes power quality problems, such as voltage sags, which are not reported to the PUCO. 
 
To get from 99.93 to 5-nine reliability, a customer would have to spend the equivalent of around 
5-6 cents/kWh on an ongoing basis.  This assumes that all equipment built has a 15-year life, 
except for the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system (battery and controls), which have a 5-
year life.  This also assumes 6.5% rate for the cost of money. 
 
A business that hooks up to a microgrid would be able to avoid all or most of these costs.  The 
UPS and back-up power systems required could be replaced in whole or in part by the microgrid, 
which would be able to provide full resiliency.  Other costs may also be avoided in whole or in 
part through a microgrid, such as demand and transmission charges, and business interruption 
insurance premiums.   
 
I. Introduction 
 
This report is part of a general microgrid planning evaluation for Cleveland, Ohio undertaken by 
Cleveland State University and Case Western Reserve University, underwritten by the Cleveland 
Foundation.1  The evaluation has been undertaken in collaboration with Cuyahoga County and 
the City of Cleveland.  This report focuses on one of the more important questions posed in 
building a microgrid: what is the marginal value of reliable power to end users?   
 
Microgrid systems are often identified as a strategy for enabling a more rapid adoption of 
renewable power generation.  Microgrids promise to better capture the value of distributed but 
intermittent power sources through electricity storage and smart control systems.  Yet the 
opportunity to build microgrid infrastructure is accelerating due not just to improvements in 
storage and control systems, but also due to cheap natural gas from shale development.  
Importantly for microgrids, natural gas generation plants also provide “flexibility and fuel 
efficiency.”2  New natural gas plants are better suited than traditional generation to respond to 
the “faster pace of grid operations driven by variable generation.”3  In short, natural gas is making 
it easier to include intermittent generation in the power grid.  This will be especially true when 
used in microgrids, where systems can be optimized through state of the art storage and controls 
used in concert with natural gas generation.   
 
                                                     
1 The Microgrid Cleveland Study Team, referenced as “μGrid Cle,” consists of Cleveland State University’s Energy 
Policy Center (Urban College), Case Western Reserve University’s Great Lakes Energy Institute, Cuyahoga County 
and the City of Cleveland, and several consultants.    The principal researchers and authors of this document are:  
Andrew R. Thomas, Robert A. Simons, Rajiv Choski, and Mark Henning, Cleveland State University; Grant Goodrich, 
Ken Loparo, Alexis Abramson and Reza Jamalzadeh, Case Western Reserve University; Ali Ahmed, Green Strategies, 
LLC; Marc Divis, Cleveland Thermal; Michael Foley, Cuyahoga County; Glenn Krassen, Bricker & Eckler; Anand 
Natarajan, City of Cleveland and John Juhasz, Telepath Systems, Inc.  
2 A. Silverstein, “If I’d Written the DOE Grid Study Recommendations,” Utility Dive, October 7, 2017, found at: 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/silverstein-if-id-written-the-doe-grid-study-recommendations/506274/ 
3 Id.  
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However, an important near-term promise that microgrids offer today is reliable power. 
Microgrids use a combination of distributed generation, batteries and advanced control systems 
to ensure that power is always available and dispatched in the amounts and condition required 
to manage the local load.  They are capable of separating from the main grid during a power 
outage, going into an “island” mode, and thereby providing their customers with power during 
general grid outages. 
 
But this sort of electrical system resiliency costs more.  How much more depends upon the 
circumstances and the complexity of the potential microgrid scope.  Inevitably, it leads end users 
to ask: what is resilient power actually worth to me?   Putting numbers on the cost of outages to 
consumers can be difficult.  Much depends upon the duration of the outage, the type of business 
involved and the timing of the event.   
 
Yet it is important to end users that the added value of resiliency be estimated.  It is also 
important that such estimates be relatable to businessmen, such as on a per-kWh basis.  Many 
end users develop their energy procurement strategy without understanding the nuance of 
energy system design or costs.   
 
There are several ways for an end user to go about assessing the value of resiliency.  One 
relatively straightforward way is to observe how business interruption insurance changes as a 
result of acquiring resiliency.  It is probably too early to project how microgrids will affect business 
interruption insurance – there are only around 15 microgrids in operation in the United States 
that have commercial end users.4   We can expect, however, that this will be a relevant future 
metric for companies that are looking to build or join a microgrid.  The extent to which the 
microgrid controller warrants delivery of power will likely affect insurance premiums. 
 
Another strategy, developed by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, is instructive.  NREL 
examined the value that energy storage has in reducing “demand” charges.  Demand charges5 
are designed to enable the utility to recover costs associated with having to maintain 
                                                     
4 The estimate of 15 microgrids with commercial loads comes from a compilation of several reports, including the 
following: “Microgrids & District Energy: Pathways to Sustainable Urban Development.” Pace Law. (n.d.). Accessed 
August 24, 2017, http://energy.pace.edu/publications/microgrids-district-energy-pathways-sustainable-urban-
development; “New York State Microgrid Inventory.” Navigant Research (on behalf of the New York State Smart 
Grid Consortium). (2015). Accessed August 24, 2017, nyssmartgrid.com/wp-
content/uploads/NewYorkStateMicrogridInventory_2015-08-1331.pdf; and Microgrid Knowledge.com, a website 
devoted to tracking developments in microgrids. 
5 Many utilities use the term  demand charge and capacity charge” interchangeably, and some utilities have both 
demand and capacity charges.  In deregulated markets, it is common to use the demand charge to recover for 
standby distribution assets, while the capacity charge is used to recover for standby generation assets.  Both often 
are determined through a complicated formula that consider such things as peak load contribution, ratchets and 
other accounting devices. PJM Interconnect, the Regional Transmission Organization for the Mid-Atlantic states, 
compares its capacity charge to a parking lot for a big box store: parking must be available to accommodate “Black 
Friday” shopping, even though much of the lot will be vacant the rest of the year.  See “Capacity Markets,” PJM 
Learning Center, found at: https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-
markets.aspx   
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infrastructure so that it can deliver power during peak demand periods.  This infrastructure – 
which includes wires, transformers, substations and other equipment -- may otherwise be idle, 
and as a result expensive to build and maintain.  The end user’s demand charge normally is 
determined by its maximum monthly usage during a short interval of time, such as 15 minutes.   
 
Demand charges are most commonly assessed to commercial and industrial users, and are not 
trivial.  NREL determined that 25% of commercial customers pay demand charges greater than 
$0.015/kWh.6   Moreover, there may be another utility charge for standby power:  end users may 
also have to pay a “capacity” charge.  Capacity charges are similar to demand charges, except 
that they are designed to compensate the utility for maintaining standby generation to supply 
peak customer requirements.  In Ohio, a typical commercial customer pays around 13% of its 
total electrical cost as a distribution charge, of which the demand charge is a significant portion, 
and another 12% of its total cost in capacity charges (see Figure 1).  This could mean another 
penny per kWh cost for a customer.  
 
 
Figure 1. Cost Structure for Mercantile (over 750,000 kWh/yr) Consumers in Ohio, 2016. 
 
Source:  Scioto Energy (2017).  Assumes: 47% load factor for Secondary, 67% load factor for Primary Power 
Customers. 
 
Having back up power, in the form of batteries, uninterruptible power supply systems and local 
generators, may be able to reduce both demand and capacity costs.  Through these systems end 
users can shave its own peak demand and also reduce coincident peak contribution during peak 
                                                     
6 See J. McLaren et al, “Identifying Potential Markets for Behind the Meter Battery Energy Storage:  A Survey of the 
U.S. Demand Charges.” National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2017) 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68963.pdf See also: E. Wood, “Wondering if Energy Storage Can Reduce Your 
Demand Charges,” Microgrid Knowledge, August 24, 2017, found at: https://microgridknowledge.com/demand-
charges-energy-storage/ 
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grid times, such as hot summer afternoons.  Utilities charge more for capacity when the end 
user’s peak requirements coincide with peak demand on the grid.   
 
But constraining demand or capacity charges require end users to actively manage their use in 
response to weather changes and other events.  Further, it is not entirely clear how demand 
charges will be assessed within a microgrid.   Microgrids may be able to disengage from the grid 
not only during outages, but also, for economic reasons, during peak grid demand.  Indeed, 
microgrids may even be able to sell excess power into the grid during times of peak demand.  
Accordingly, the savings that microgrids supply to end users from demand or capacity charges 
will be highly dependent upon circumstances.  
 
Two other ways can be used to estimate the added value of resiliency: (1) determining the value 
of lost load (i.e. lost business opportunity) and (2) determining the value of avoided costs.  This 
study has undertaken to examine ways these estimate the value of resiliency for end users 
through these two strategies.  To do this, we must start first with an understand of how resilient 
the grid currently is in its present form.   
 
II. Current Levels of Grid Resiliency 
 
To understand the value of resiliency to customers, we must first consider the current status of 
resiliency in terms of the frequency and duration of loss (or diminishment) of power supply.  Once 
we understand these, we can compare this to what level of resiliency would be desirable, and 
then assess the costs of achieving that level.  
 
Many urban areas have a choice of an investor-owned utility or a municipally owned utility for 
delivery of electricity.  Cleveland, Ohio, for instance, has two distribution utilities:  Cleveland 
Electric and Illuminating Company (CEI) and Cleveland Public Power (CPP).  CEI is a subsidiary of 
FirstEnergy, Inc. and is regulated by the Public Utility Commission of Ohio (PUCO). CPP is a 
municipally owned utility, and is not subject to PUCO oversight, but rather has local government 
oversight. 
 
For purposes of estimating the reliability of the existing grid, CEI serves as useful guide for 
understanding likely outages. This is so for two reasons.  First, because Cleveland is relatively safe 
from natural disasters compared to other urban areas,7 CEI serves as a conservative example for 
estimating downtime.  Second, CEI reports its outages to the PUCO.  Cleveland’s municipal utility, 
Cleveland Public Power, is not required to file outage reports with PUCO, even though it is likely 
to be at least as resilient as the investor-owned utility.  Municipal utilities tend to have fewer 
                                                     
7 See e.g. E. Bamforth, “Cleveland Ranks No. 2 in Safety from Natural Disasters,” Cleveland.com, September 8, 
2017, (citing CBS News), found at:  
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/09/cleveland_ranks_2nd_in_list_of.html 
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interruptions because power lines are below ground and because customers are located closer 
together.8  
 
Table 1 shows the average annual number of interruptions per customer served and average 
minutes per customer interruption between 2014 and 2016 for Ohio investor-owned electric 
utilities. These were estimated using data reported to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 
(PUCO).9   
 
Table 1. Average Annual Frequency and Duration of Outages  
for Ohio's Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 2014-2016. 
Utility Average Interruptions 
per Customer 
Average Minutes per 
Customer Interruption 
Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Company 
2.7 73.4 
Ohio Edison 2.4 48.1 
Toledo Edison 2.1 46.4 
Ohio Power 2.7 80.7 
Duke Energy 2.7 77.1 
Dayton Power & Light 2.3 59.1 
                 Source: Public Utilities Commission of Ohio10 
 
The outages can be further refined based upon how they are reported.  This includes the 
following types of outages: 
 
Major events. These encompass any calendar day when an electric utility’s system 
average interruption duration index (SAIDI) exceeds a major event day threshold as 
defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in their “IEEE Guide 
for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices.”11 The method for determining this 
threshold is to add 2.5 standard deviations to the average12 of an electric utility’s daily 
SAIDI performance during the most recent five-year period.13 The SAIDI index can be 
characterized as indicating the total duration of interruption for the average customer.14 
                                                     
8 See “EIA data show average frequency and duration of electric power outages.” U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. (2016). Accessed July 27, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27892.  
Underground lines reduce risk from vandalism, storms, tree/limb falls, animals or other incidents.   
9 Investor owned utilities must report outages in compliance with the Ohio Administrative Code Rule 4901:1-10-10 
also known as Rule 10.  
10 See id.  Note that the investor owned utilities do not report all events together, as we have done here.  So if one 
looks at the PUCO reports, one would not see a chart like this.  This was created by compiling different data. 
11 Ohio Administrative Code Rule 4901:1-10-01.  
12 In practice, the average of the natural logarithms of the SAIDI index for a given utility is used to determine the 
major event threshold. 
13 This is known as the IEEE 2.5 Beta Method.  
14 Robinson, David G., Douglas J. Arent, and Larry Johnson. "Impact of distributed energy resources on the 
reliability of critical telecommunications facilities." In Telecommunications Energy Conference, 2006. INTELEC'06. 
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Major events can therefore be described as outages where the average customer 
experiences a disruption lasting far longer than what is normal for a typical outage, such 
as those resulting from severe weather. 
 
Transmission outages. This describes any outage involving facilities that would be 
included in rate setting by the federal energy regulation commission (FERC).15 
 
Momentary interruptions.  This describes electricity disruptions with a duration of five 
minutes or less.16  
 
Distribution outage. The Rule 10 reporting procedure does not use this term, but rather 
just describes the remaining outages as those not falling into the first three categories.  
For lack of a better descriptive term, we deploy this term as a catchall to indicate 
sustained interruptions within the distribution system lasting more than 5 minutes that 
are caused by neither major events nor transmission outages.   
 
It is important, however, to recognize that utility reported outages do not include “brownouts.”  
Brownouts refer to deteriorations in power quality, such as sags in voltage, that frequently have 
the same effect as a power outage, especially for businesses that rely on computers, including, 
among other industries, those that use sensitive devices, clean rooms, and data.17 
  
Average interruptions per customer in Table 1 were calculated as the sum of two indices: (1) the 
system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) for transmission, distribution and major 
outages using data found in the Rule 10 reports that investor-owned utilities file annually with 
PUCO;18 plus (2) the momentary average interruption frequency index (MAIFI), as estimated19 by 
the American Public Power Association among municipal/cooperative power utilities for 
“momentary” outages of five minutes or less.20 The national MAIFI was determined to be 1.35 
                                                     
28th Annual International, pp. 1-7. IEEE, 2006.  SAIDI reports do not typically include long duration outages.  
However, the PUCO requires that these are reported in Ohio, even if they are not in the SAIDI numbers.  
Accordingly, we were able to include long duration outages in our analysis for Cleveland Electric & Illuminating 
Company uptime.   
15 See fn 9, supra. 
16 Id.  
17 Power quality can be affected by frequency changes, voltage swings, and localized harmonics. See M. Hartfiel, 
“UPS Cures for Power Quality Problems, March, 2001, found at: http://www.ecmweb.com/content/ups-cures-
power-quality-problems 
18 Rule 10 filings can be downloaded at: http://dis.puc.ohio.gov/CasesByIndustryPurposeStatus.aspx? 
indcode=EL&purpcode=ESS&status=OPEN&count=(32%20cases) 
19 MAIFI cannot be calculated directly for Ohio investor-owned utilities given that there is no requirement to 
report the number of customers interrupted during momentary outages for Rule 10 reports to PUCO.   
20 See “Evaluation of Data Submitted in APPA’s 2013 Distribution System Reliability & Operations Survey.” 
American Public Power Association. (2014). Accessed August 19, 2017, www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs 
/2013DSReliabilityAndOperationsReport_FINAL.pdf.  This estimate for MAIFI is likely to be conservative given that 
the APPA’s survey participants predominantly serve load in urban areas20 and, as noted by the Energy Information 
Administration, municipal utility customers experience the lowest frequency and duration of power outages, which 
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interruptions per customer per utility.  For comparison, in California, where MAIFI is reported for 
investor owned utilities, the average number of momentary outages per customer was 1.84 in 
2015.21   
 
Average minutes per customer interruption across all outage types, as seen in Table 1, was 
determined by adding up the total minutes of power disruption among all customers due to 
transmission, distribution and major events, which can be gathered from the reports to PUCO. 
To this number was added an estimate of the total minutes of power disruption among all 
customers due to momentary interruptions, based on the number of customers served (also 
available in the PUCO reports) multiplied by the MAIFI of 1.35, times an assumed average 
duration of 2.5 minutes per momentary interruption.22   
 
This total number of minutes (transmission plus distribution plus major plus momentary 
interruption minutes) of interruption was then divided by the total number of customer 
interruptions for all outage types.  This gives us the average duration per customer per outage.  
Those numbers are set forth in Table 1.  For Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI), a 
typical customer averages 2.7 outages per year, with an average duration of 73 minutes.  
 
A more detailed look at estimates for CEI’s average annual frequency and duration of outages is 
set forth in Table 2 using the same method as in Table 1 but for a longer period of time where 
outages were disaggregated by type into the four categories defined earlier. 
 
                                                     
can be attributed to fewer powerline miles per customer and underground distribution lines.  See id, and “EIA data 
show average frequency and duration of electric power outages.” Accessed July 27, 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27892 
21 See “California Electric Reliability Investor-Owned Utilities Performance Review, 2006-2015.” California Public 
Utilities Commission. (2016). Accessed August 20, 2017, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles 
/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work 
/PPD_Work_Products_(2014_forward)/PPD%20Reliability%20Review.pdf.    
22 The average minutes per customer interruption for a given year were estimated as follows: 
i. The number of customer minutes interrupted for momentary interruptions is the number of minutes per 
interruption multiplied by the number of these kinds of interruptions. 
ii. The number of customer interruptions due to momentary outages was determined by multiplying the 
assumed MAIFI of 1.35 by the total number of customers served as found in the Rule 10 reports.  
iii. This number of customer interruptions due to momentary outages was then multiplied by the number of 
minutes per interruption. Momentary interruptions last for 5 minutes or less by definition. However, there 
is no publicly available data describing the average duration of momentary outages. Therefore, a midpoint 
value of 2.5 minutes per interruption was used to estimate the number of customer minutes interrupted 
due to momentary interruptions.  
iv. For a given year, add together all customer minutes interrupted (including those from sustained outages 
which are included in the Rule 10 reports) and divide this by the sum of all customer interruptions to arrive 
at the average minutes per customer interruption across all outage types. 
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Table 2. Average Annual Frequency and Duration of Outages  
for CEI by Outage Type from 2009 to 2016.23 
 Avg. Total Customer 
Interruptions per year 
Avg. Total Customer Minutes 
Interrupted per year 
Avg. Minutes per 
Customer Interruption 
major event 206,892 167,540,935 624.6 
transmission 
outage 
55,146 8,260,191 120.8 
momentary 
interruption 
982,933 2,457,332 2.524 
distribution 
outage 
733,900 84,305,168 114.5 
ALL outages 1,978,871 262,563,626 129.325 
  Source: Authors (2017). 
 
Table 2 tells us that the most common interruption is the “momentary interruption,” which most 
of us can attest to from casual observation.  Our notion of a momentary interruption is often 
corroborated by the “resetting” of digital clocks.   However, “major events” and “distribution 
outage” make up nearly all of the duration.  Those who may value resiliency can from this 
determine the sort of resiliency that they may require: short term, long term or both. Table 3 
sets forth the likely duration of outages based upon the last eight years in CEI territory.26 Based 
upon this analysis, interruptions of less than five minutes made up around 36% of the disruptions, 
and disruptions of 60-180 minutes made up half the outages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 Rule 10 filings can be downloaded at: http://dis.puc.ohio.gov/CasesByIndustryPurposeStatus.aspx? 
indcode=EL&purpcode=ESS&status=OPEN&count=(32%20cases) 
24  MAIFI cannot be calculated directly for Ohio investor-owned utilities given there is no requirement to report the 
number of customers interrupted during momentary outages for Rule 10 reports to PUCO.  See also, fn 22, supra.  
25 Minutes per customer interruption for all outages is a weighted average based on the contribution of each type 
of outage to the total number of customer minutes interrupted.  
26 The Rule 10 reports disaggregate outages by cause (e.g. animal, equipment failure, human error) along with 
associated data enabling the calculation of average outage duration for each separate cause. There are more than 
20 different outage causes that are reported separately for each of the 3 types of non-momentary outages. This 
enables the construction of a frequency distribution showing the probability that an outage would last a certain 
length of time, given that there was a power interruption. Table 2 shows such a frequency distribution table using 
CEI outage data pursuant to Rule 10 for the years 2009 through 2016. Momentary interruptions were again 
assumed to have a duration of 2.5 minutes. 
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Table 3. Frequency of Average Outage Durations for All CEI Power Interruptions, 2009-2016. 
t = time in minutes outage frequency 
for this duration 
probability of duration 
t ≤ 5 39,894 0.357 
5 < t ≤ 30 293 0.003 
30 < t ≤ 60 1,553 0.014 
60 < t ≤ 120 27,644 0.247 
120 < t ≤ 180 28,216 0.253 
180 < t < 240 3,156 0.028 
240 < t ≤ 300 1,840 0.016 
300 < t ≤ 360 1,020 0.009 
360 < t ≤ 420 1,380 0.012 
420 < t ≤ 480 768 0.007 
480 < t 5,958 0.053 
TOTAL  111,722 1.000 
                                  Source:  Authors (2017) (using PUCO reports). 
 
The CEI Rule 10 data for this time period can also be translated into a power availability index for 
Cleveland. The average service system availability index (ASAI) is a commonly used measure of 
system wide reliability for an electricity distribution utility.27  This metric represents the total time 
that service was provided to customers (net of all outages) divided by the total time that service 
was demanded by all utilities customers. Availability is defined by the number of “nines” for 
which power is up, such as “4-nines”, “5-nines,” etc.28 This simply refers to the percentage of 
time that a customer can expect to be available, such as 99.99% of the time, or 99.999% of the 
time, etc.   
 
Given the number of customers served annually by CEI between 2009 and 2016,29 and the total 
minutes that service was interrupted  across all outage types as found in the Rule 10 reports,30 
the average service availability was around 99.93% over this time period for the area served by 
the investor-owned utility.  This would be equivalent to “3-nines” using the “uptime” industry 
vernacular for power availability. Availability of at least 5-nines, or 99.999%, in terms of both 
reliable and resilient power, is the general standard that companies within the 
telecommunications industry, including data centers, strive to achieve.31  
                                                     
27 Bichpuriya, Yogesh K., Prashant V. Navalkar, and S. A. Soman. "Benchmarking of reliability indices for electricity 
distribution utilities: approach and discussion." (2011): 14-14. 
28 Govindan, Sriram, Di Wang, L. Y. Chen, Anand Sivasubramaniam, and Bhuvan Urgaonkar. "Modeling and analysis 
of availability of datacenter power infrastructure." Technical Report CSE-10-006 (2010). 
29 Service demand is calculated as the number of customers served multiplied by the number of minutes per year.  
30 See fn 23, supra.  
31 Stevenson, Rick. “How Low-Cost Telecom Killed Five 9s in Cloud Computing.” Wired. (n.d.). Accessed August 22, 
2017, https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/03/how-low-cost-telecom-killed-five-9s-in-cloud-computing.  See 
also:   See “Beyond five nines availability: Achieving high availability with Dell Compellent storage center (Dell 
Compellent White Paper).” Dell. (2012). Accessed August 22, 2017, http://i.dell.com/sites/doccontent/shared-
content/datasheets/en/Documents/Compellent_Five_Nines_9_12.pdf  
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Those same industries that need 5-nines power must also maintain power quality.  Utilities 
generally are responsible for reliability only, and not power quality.32 Brownouts are typically 
handled by “Uninterruptible Power Supply” (UPS) systems.  These consist of batteries and control 
systems that can respond instantly to surges, sags and other power quality problems.33  
 
Brownouts may not be reported by utilities, but they are of great concern to many end users.   
While most industrial customers have a general awareness of the costs of power outages, they 
are commonly less aware of the costs associated with poor power quality. These costs can show 
up in plant downtown, equipment replacement, lost work in process, additional labor, missed 
shipment deadlines and so on.34    
 
III. Valuing Resiliency 
 
A. Who Needs Resiliency 
 
The easiest way to determine who might pay for energy supply security is to identify who expends 
what money on power backup facilities.35  In Ohio, state EPA permit data may be indicative of 
who may be interested. The permit provisions for air pollution sources under Ohio Administrative 
Code 3745-31-03(A)(4) set forth the conditions for operation of emergency electrical 
generation.36  The Ohio EPA’s database of active permits-by-rule for emergency electrical 
generators powered by fuels such as diesel, distillate oil, and natural gas includes 4,673 records 
where both the amount of power and the permit holder are identified. These generators have a 
combined power rating of 1556 MW in Ohio, of which approximately 16.5% is deployed by 
companies in the Telecommunications and Data Processing & Hosting subsectors, corresponding 
to the 3-digit NAICS codes 517 and 518, respectively.37   
 
Certain types of industries, such as telecommunications and data storage centers (which targets 
5-nines service availability),38 are likely to value resiliency more than other industries, such as 
traditional manufacturing.  For future research, the owners of permitted generation can be 
mapped to 3-digit and probably 4-digit NAICS levels and those industries using back up power 
                                                     
32 K. Olikara, “Power Quality Issues, Impacts, and Mitigation for Industrial Customers, Rockwell Automation, Inc., 
found at: http://literature.rockwellautomation.com/idc/groups/literature/documents/wp/power-wp002_-en-
p.pdf 
33 While UPS systems can handle voltage swings, frequency changes and local harmonics, they may not be able to 
handle other less common events, such as high ground current, inductive noise, system harmonics, phase 
imbalance, low power factor, or lightning.  See Hartfield, “UPS Cures for Power Quality,” fn 17, supra. 
34 Olikara, “Power Quality Issues,” supra. 
35 de Nooij, Michiel, C. Koopmans, and C. Bijvoet. "The value of supply security: The costs of power interruptions: 
Economic input for damage reduction and investment in networks." Energy Economics 29, no. 2 (2007): 277-295. 
36 See “Permit-by-Rule Fact Sheet (PDF).” Accessed August 8, 2017, http://epa.ohio.gov/dapc/pbr 
/permitbyrule.aspx 
37 Authors’ calculations. 
38 See “IP Telephony: The Fine Nines Story (White Paper).” Cisco. (2002). Accesses September 12, 2017, 
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/global/it_it/solutions/pdf/ipcom/5nine_story_wp.pdf 
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can be identified.  This list can also be compared to economic growth to identify which industries 
both value resiliency and are also likely to expand.  
 
B.  Valuing Resiliency in Terms of Lost Production 
 
Demand for resilient power can be described in terms of the average willingness of electricity 
consumers to pay to avoid an additional period (e.g. one hour) without power.39  The willingness 
to pay for energy security will be determined by a variety of considerations, including the 
frequency, duration and disruptive effects of the outages.  One way to value the resiliency 
brought by a microgid would be to estimate avoided costs of not having to pay for backup power 
systems.  Those costs are discussed in below.  Another way to value resiliency is to estimate the 
cost of lost productivity.  This latter cost is estimated herein below. 
 
This value of electricity supply security to productivity is known as the “value of lost load,” or  
“VOLL.”40  Valuing lost production due to power loss is consistent with the economic notion of 
opportunity cost.  A common method for identifying VOLL for different commercial and industrial 
customers is through what is known as the “production function approach.” This method 
estimates the consequences of outages through lost production.41  Under this relatively 
straightforward model, energy resiliency within a given sector was valued by the ratio of “gross 
value added” to “electricity consumption:”   
 
Gross Value Added ($)/Electricity Consumption (kWh) 
 
“Gross value added” was determined from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) input-output 
tables that show the flow of commodities from production through intermediate use by 
industries and then on to purchases by final users. The BLS tables were derived from input-output 
data initially developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).42  This ratio provides an 
estimate for the VOLL for a given industry.43  
 
“Electricity consumption” was determined from the Census Bureau’s 2012 “Economic Census,” 
which is the most recent source available for the collection of such data across all industries.  
Consumption was estimated for average electricity purchases by industry.  The Census Bureau 
                                                     
39 Leahy, Eimear, and Richard SJ Tol. "An estimate of the value of lost load for Ireland." Energy Policy 39, no. 3 
(2011): 1514-1520. 
40 de Nooij, Michiel, C. Koopmans, and C. Bijvoet. "The demand for supply security." In Research Symposium 
European Electricity Markets. 2003. Accessed August 3, 2017, https://www.ecn.nl/fileadmin/ecn/units/bs 
/Symp_Electricity-markets/b1_2-paper.pdf 
41 de Nooij, Michiel, C. Koopmans, and C. Bijvoet. "The value of supply security: The costs of power interruptions: 
Economic input for damage reduction and investment in networks." Energy Economics 29, no. 2 (2007): 277-295. 
This VOLL strategy may not capture all costs of business interruption due to outages.  
42 The BLS tables were chosen for this study due to its more detailed industry level classification compared to the 
original BEA tables (more than 200 sub-industry groupings for the former versus 71 for the latter). 
43 There are a number of limitations to this method of estimating the value of load loss, including the assumption 
of a linear relationship between duration of disruption and total cost.  However, this is a commonly accepted 
method for valuing load loss among experts.  See fn 41, supra. 
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collects consumption data by industry in dollars.  Only manufacturing industries produces 
electricity purchase data available in kWh.  Accordingly, electricity purchase data for all other 
industries had to be converted from dollars to kWh by using the manufacturing data to generate 
a regression.44  To the extent that manufacturing receives electricity at a lower price than do 
other industries, electricity consumption may be overestimated for other industries.  This in turn 
lowers the VOLL for non-manufacturers.  However, since such a bias would tend to make for 
lower VOLL numbers for non-manufacturers, it is a more conservative estimate. 
 
The predictors in this regression were total dollar amount of electricity purchased and the 
number of establishments within a given industry (both of these were known for all industries).45 
Upon estimating electricity purchases in kilowatt-hours for non-manufacturing industries, VOLL 
was calculated for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing subsectors to the 3- and 4-digit 
NAICS level. Figure 2 shows the highest VOLL for industries.  
 
 
Figure 2. Values of Lost Load Per kWh by Industry Description. 
 
Source:  Authors (2017).  Based upon U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012).  
 
                                                     
44 The predictive model employed here focuses on association between variables rather than any underlying causal 
structure that would otherwise require endogeneity (e.g. simultaneous causality) to be addressed. See Shmueli, 
Galit. "To explain or to predict?" Statistical science 25, no. 3 (2010): 289-310. 
45 The specified model is 𝑙 𝑛(kWh) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙 𝑛(cost) + 𝛽2𝑙 𝑛(no.  of establishments) + 𝜀. The fitted values were 
exponentiated in order to arrive at kWh predictions for non-manufacturing industries. Fitting the model to the 
data resulted in an R2 of 99.09%.  
Computer and peripheral equipment mfg., excluding digital camera mfg.
Offices of other health practitioners
Newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishers
Rental and Leasing Services
Specialized design services
Other professional, scientific, and technical services
Truck transportation
Offices of physicians
Audio and video equipment manufacturing
Household appliance manufacturing
Other transportation equipment manufacturing
Transit and ground passenger transportation
Securities and other financial investments and related act.
Water transportation
Software publishers
Advertising, public relations, and related services
Administrative and Support Services
Air transportation
Cable and other subscription programming
Home health care services
Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services
Insurance Carriers and Related Activities
Legal services
Management, scientific, and technical consulting services
Computer systems design and related services
100806040200
In
d
u
st
ry
 D
e
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
VOLL ($/kWh)
Highest Values of Lost Load for All Industries
 14 
As can be seen, the VOLL numbers indicate that industries that consume a 1 MW load can suffer 
losses of up to $100,000/hour.   Not surprisingly, data heavy businesses, such as law, accounting, 
banking and insurance firms seem to incur the greatest losses from power outages.  Further, 
VOLL losses for a number of manufacturing industries are non-trivial, due in part to their larger 
load requirements.  For instance, a household appliance manufacturer that uses 10 MW of power 
is likely to lose $340,000 in a one-hour power outage.   Economic development outreach to 
manufacturers is valued because of job creation and Gross Domestic Product Growth.  
Accordingly, additional research is needed to identify what manufacturers may value resiliency, 
and those industries can be targeted for the microgrid. 
 
C. Valuing Resiliency in Terms of Avoided Costs   
 
Another method for estimating the value of resiliency is to calculate the marginal cost for any 
company to move to incrementally higher levels of power availability.  This can be most readily 
accomplished by estimating the cost of building in-house data centers.  The data center company 
Expedient,46 in partnership with Intel, provides an online cost calculator for companies that are 
considering building their own in-house data centers (also known as enterprise data centers).  
The calculation is based on Expedient’s own experience, together with industry benchmarks.47 
This data center cost calculator returns cost estimates for the following levels of expected service 
availability that coincide with the Uptime Institute’s 4-level classification system: 48 
 
Table 4. Uptime Institute Service Availability Levels. 
Level Service Availability Annual Expected 
Time Without Service 
(in minutes) 
Expected Service 
Time Gained (in 
minutes) 
1 99.671% 1729 -- 
2 99.741% 1361 368 
3 99.982% 95 1266 
4 99.995% 26 69 
                                            Source:  Uptime Institute (2017).  
 
 
                                                     
46 Expedient operates two 32,500 sq. ft. colocation data centers in the Cleveland area. Such data centers provide 
computer network services and data storage for companies choosing to outsource their IT.   
47 See “The Complete Data Center Build Vs. Buy Calculator.” Expedient. Accessed September 7, 2017, 
https://www.expedient.com/data-center-build-vs-buy-calculator 
48 The Uptime Institute refers to these power availability categories as tiers, but we refer to them as levels here so 
as not to conflict with our prior description of customer tiers within the Cleveland microgrid. See also Nemeth, Evi, 
Garth Snyder, and Trent R. Hein. 2006. Linux administration handbook. [electronic resource]. n.p.: Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2006, c2007. OhioLINK Library Catalog – LR, EBSCOhost (accessed September 8, 2017). 
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Other calculator parameters include number of cabinets,49 total kW of redundant power, 
evaluation period,50 the percentage of available power consumed,51 cost per kWh for electricity, 
and internet connection speed. In using the calculator to estimate cost differences at different 
levels of availability, the ratio of “total kW of redundant power” to “number of cabinets” was set 
at 4:1 for power levels of 1,000 kW, 500 kW, and 250 kW.52  A power density of 4 kW per cabinet 
is considered typical for data centers.53  We also assumed that: 
 
 Servers and uninterruptible power supply (UPS) have 5 year lifetimes54 while all other 
data center fixed assets have 15 year lifetimes.55 
 The proportion of available power consumed was 60%.56 
 The price of electricity was $0.10/kWh.57 
 The internet connection speed for the hypothetical data center was 100 Mbps.58  
 
Based upon placing the above parameter settings into the Expedient calculator for a 1 MW data 
center,59 a table was developed that sets forth the cost of increasing availability by line item of 
necessary equipment and services.  Table 5 shows the added cost resulting from these 
incremental increases in availability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
49 Cabinets are the enclosures that house computer networking servers. 
50 The evaluation period is the expected lifetime for data center components before needing to be replaced. 
51 Percentage of available power consumed is a measure of efficiency. A higher percentage indicates more effective 
power usage (i.e. less waste).  
52 The calculator maximum for setting total kW of redundant power was 1000 kW.  
53 Rasmussen, Neil. “Calculating Space and Power Density Requirements for Data Centers (APC White Paper 155).” 
APC-Schneider Electric. (2013).  
54 Firms and government units that operate data centers generally replace servers and UPS after 3-5 years. 5 years 
was chosen by the research team as a more conservative cost estimate for these items.  See “Information 
Technology Equipment Life Cycle.” State of Michigan. (2011). Accessed September 8, 2017, 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/dtmb/ITLifecycle_379666_7.pdf 
55 See Koomey, Jonathan. “A Simple Model for Determining True Total Cost of Ownership for Data Centers.” Uptime 
Institute White Paper. (2008). Accessed September 8, 2017, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc 
/download?doi=10.1.1.474.7834&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
56 Expedient states that this is the average percentage for an enterprise data center. See hover popup for this 
parameter data center cost calculator webpage at www.expedient.com/data-center-build-vs-buy-calculator 
57 This was approximately equal to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s electricity price estimate for 
commercial end-users in Ohio as of June 2017. See “Electric Power Monthly.” U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. (August 24, 2017). Accessed September 8, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly 
/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_6_a 
58 The calculator maximum for setting internet connection speed was 100 Mbps. 
59 Ultimately, setting the power level to 500 kW or 250 kW did not affect the eventual value of resiliency in terms 
of $/kWh.  
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Table 5. Added Cost Associated with Increased Availability by Line Item60  
in 2017 Dollars for 1 MW Data Center. 
  Difference Between 
Levels 1 and 2 
Difference Between 
Levels 2 and 3 
Difference Between 
Levels 3 and 4 
Engineering and Preparation 61,725 648,109 123,449 
Power Systems/Electrical Equipment 730,588 7,671,177 1,461,178 
Environmental Controls 159,261 1,672,236 318,521 
Security and Monitoring 15,565 163,430 31,129 
Core Network Equipment 33,000 346,500 66,000 
Electrical Maintenance 53,012 556,621 106,023 
HVAC Maintenance 1,984 20,832 3,968 
Other Systems Maintenance 1,032 10,831 2,063 
Source:  Authors (based upon Expedient website). 
 
The last two maintenance items reflect differences in annual operating expenses while all other 
items represent differences in construction or capital costs.61  The differences in annual operating 
expenses were added to the differences in annualized capital costs for each column in order to 
arrive at a total annual added cost for moving to the next highest level of availability.62  This total 
annual added cost was then divided by the total annual kilowatt hours for a hypothetical data 
center given its power rating and availability level. So, for instance, a 1 MW data center with 
99.671% (Level 1) availability would be assumed to have a one-year electrical consumption of:  
 
1 MW ×  24 hours ×  365 days ×  0.99671 = 8,731,180 kWh. 
 
Table 6 shows the resulting marginal cost per kWh in going to the next highest level of availability 
for a 1,000 kW data center using Expedient’s cost calculator. This rate was not different for the 
other power levels, nor did it change when separately varying percentage of available power 
consumed or cost per kWh for electricity,63 while holding the remaining parameters constant.  
 
 
                                                     
60 More detailed line item costs are available on the Expedient website.  
61 Electrical maintenance, while ostensibly an operating cost, was also considered a fixed cost as it did not vary at 
all when the calculator parameter for Evaluation Period was adjusted.  
62 Annualized capital costs were determined using the static annuity method where a capital recovery factor (CRF) 
is calculated for each capital item and is defined as: 
𝐶𝑅𝐹 =
𝑖(1 + 𝑖)𝑛
(1 + 𝑖)𝑛 − 1
 
where 𝑖 is a discount rate and 𝑛 is the lifetime of the asset. See Koomey, Jonathan. “A Simple Model for Determining 
True Total Cost of Ownership for Data Centers.” Uptime Institute White Paper. (2008). Accessed September 8, 2017, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.474.7834&rep=rep1&type=pdf. See also Damodaran, 
Aswatch. “Cost of Capital by Sector (US).” New York University. (2017). Accessed September 5, 2017, 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.htm  
63 Note that the value of resiliency represents a distinct cost that is related but separate from the cost for electricity. 
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Table 6. Annual Marginal Cost for Increased Service Availability for 1 MW Data Center. 
Change in 
Service 
Availability 
Total 
Additional 
Annualized 
Cost 
Electricity 
Consumption 
(kWh) at Higher 
Level of 
Availability 
Additional 
Availability 
at Higher 
Level 
Additional 
Cost/kWh at 
Higher Level of 
Availability 
(rounded to 
nearest cent) 
Additional 
Availability per 
1-cent/kWh at 
Next Highest 
Level 
Level 1 to 2 $150,063 8,737,312 0.07% $0.02 0.040% 
Level 2 to 3 $1,575,659 8,758,423 0.241% $0.18 0.013% 
Level 3 to 4 $300,125 8,759,562 0.013% $0.03 0.004% 
Source: The Authors (2017). 
 
These calculations suggest that, based on the experience of one data center service company, 
some data centers have incurred costs of more than $0.20/kWh in order to move from two-nines 
to near five-nines availability.64  By standardizing the percentage of service availability purchased 
for every 1-cent/kWh at each new level, we see that marginal costs for reliability accelerate with 
improving availability. This is consistent with what researchers at Penn State University and IBM 
found in a study of data center availability and infrastructure.  In their analysis of the added cost 
for data centers (a likely microgrid customer), the researchers found that a per-unit of energy 
cost increase of 25% would be required to move from 3-nines to 4-nines, while a 75% per-unit 
energy cost increase would be incurred to move from 3-nines to 5-nines availability.65  
 
For CEI, we estimated that its reliability (excluding brownouts) averaged around 99.93% over the 
past 8 years.  Using the above charts, we can estimate that improving from this level to 99.999% 
reliability (the target for data centers) would cost around $0.05 to $0.06/kWh.  This is based upon 
improving 0.04% within level 2 until level 3 is reached, then improving from level 3 to level 4, and 
then finally improving 0.004% more within level 4.66  An illustration of the marginal cost 
                                                     
64 The Uptime Institute levels do not improve evenly.  The improvement between levels 1 and 2 is 0.07%, 2 to 3 
0.24% and 3 to 4 0.01%.  This explains in part why there is an uneven cost increase for improved resiliency levels.  
Overall, each cent per kWh is purchasing less availability as one moves up from one level to the next.  
65 Govindan, Sriram, Di Wang, L. Y. Chen, Anand Sivasubramaniam, and Bhuvan Urgaonkar. "Modeling and analysis 
of availability of datacenter power infrastructure." Technical Report CSE-10-006 (2010).  For instance, the cost of 
additional uninterruptible power supply (UPS) infrastructure to raise reliability from 3 nines to 4 nines would be an 
additional $6000 per rack (a unit of measure for physical computer center framework).  This means a cost increase 
from $18,000 to $24,000 per rack. See id.  
66 Assuming that CEI offers 99.93% availability on average, Table 4 tells us that this corresponds to level 2 
reliability since it is more than 99.741% for level 2, but less than the 99.982% associated with level 3. If, for 
example, a commercial customer of CEI’s decided to build an in-house data center on its premises, our research 
represented in Table 6 indicates that it would spend around an extra 1-cent-per-kWh to increase its power 
availability by 0.04% from 99.93% to 99.97%. We considered this to be close enough to the threshold of 99.982% 
for level 3 since the average of 99.93% was brought down by a year of particularly low availability in 2012 and that 
the four most recent years had availability of at least 99.95%. After spending 1-cent-per-kWh to get to level 3, the 
company could then pay $0.03 (3.4 cents before rounding) to move to level 4 and its availability of 99.995%, as 
seen in Tables 10 and 12.  At this level of availability, it would cost a company wanting to increase service 
availability 1-cent-per-kWh for every additional 0.004% of reliability. If the commercial customer in our example 
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associated with this incremental improvement in service availability for CEI’s territory can be 
seen below in Figure 3. This gives us a rough estimate ($0.053/kWh) of the added value for 
resiliency offered by a microgrid that provides 5-nine reliability.  Notably, the microgrid would 
also provide protection against brown outs, which protection is not included in the 99.93% 
estimate.  
 
Figure 3. Marginal Cost of Additional Service Availability in CEI Territory. 
 
 
While the Expedient calculations are for adding additional levels of power resiliency for data-
center facilities, similar costs would likely be incurred by any company or operation that would 
seek to install additional power resiliency. The significance of these costs must be taken into 
account by any company that is considering options for increasing the resiliency of their power. 
 
These estimates of marginal costs of resiliency are conservative.  The base uptime of 99.93% is 
likely generous for most distribution utilities, not only because CEI is located in a region that has 
few natural disasters, but also because it does not include brownouts and other unreported 
power quality problems.  Moreover, even though CEI has averaged 99.93% uptime over the past 
8 years, it is important to remember that CEI does not warrant delivery of that much uptime.  Nor 
does it provide 99.93% uptime for quality power.  Accordingly, for those who need 5-nine power 
reliability, the 5-6 cents/kWh cost is likely to be on the low side.  If you assume that for quality 
time, the uptime is closer to the Level 2 rate of 99.741%, the cost for reaching five 9s is over 
$0.20/kWh.   
 
                                                     
decided to spend this penny, it would have spent $0.01 + $0.034 + $0.01 = 5.4 cents in order to get to 99.93% + 
0.04% + 0.013% + 0.004% = 99.999%, also known as 5-nines.  
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Finally, this analysis makes no attempt to value the environmental or security values of resiliency.  
Technologies that enable a more rapid transition to renewable power generation will of course 
also provide value as an extrinsic avoided cost.  Like other environmental costs associated with 
the commons, these costs are difficult to quantify.  That does not mean they should be ignored, 
however.  Likewise, resiliency also has value for national and local security.  This value is also 
difficult to quantify, and is not included in this study.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The national discussion about the value of resiliency is in the early stages.  These discussions are 
important because we are, as a society, rethinking how the grid of the future will look.  Before 
we invest heavily into grid edge technologies that improve reliability, we need to know what 
value these will provide.  This knowledge will guide us in optimizing grid systems, and in 
understanding what investments we need to make where. 
 
We have reason to believe, however, that for many businesses that require reliable and high 
quality power, resiliency is worth at least 5 cents/kWh, and probably a good deal more.  The 
national average commercial cost of electricity in the United States was around 11 cents/kWh in 
August 2017.67  This means that a microgrid operator that seeks to attract commercial businesses 
should probably target a price of around 15-16 cents/kWh or lower for 5-nine power.  Much will 
depend, of course, on local market conditions.  
 
But this price only reflects part of the value of resiliency to the end user.  There is additional value 
added from opportunities gained (measured by the VOLL), lower business interruption insurance 
premiums, and possibly reduced or avoided demand, capacity and transmission charges. These 
additional values are likely to be made more clear as microgrids and other resilient systems 
become more common.      
 
 
                                                     
67 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, August 2017.  Accessed August 24, 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_6_a. 
 
